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an offer, and the surviving spouse has the privilege of accepting the offer
or, in lieu thereof, to take under the laws of succession. 20
It can thus be concluded from the principal case, and from the deci-
sions mentioned and cited therein, that the heirs of a surviving spouse
cannot elect for a deceased surviving spouse, do not apply unless the elec-
tion is to take under the will. Therefore, whenever a surviving spouse dies
before making an election to take under a will which gives less in value
than the statutory share to the surviving spouse, it is the duty of the court
to decree the statuory share to the surviving spouse's estate. The cases
holding that the heirs of a surviving spouse cannot make an election do
not apply. All that is necessary is for the court to be advised by some in-
terested party whether the legacy or devise to the surviving spouse would
be less in value than the surviving spouse would receive under the law of
succession. If such fact is determined to be true it is the duty of the court
to decree the statutory share to the surviving spouse's estate. This is be-
cause the surviving spouse already has the statutory share and no election
is necessary or acceptance required to receive what one already has. Under
our statute the election of the surviving spouse is the acceptance of the
offer to take less than the statutory share.
However, if by chance the proceedings go to final judgment in the
County Court, this judgment not being appealed from, and without the
question of election being called to the court's attention, the judgment
has the finality of any other judgment. This would be true even though
the surviving spouse actually received less in value than the statute pro-
vides.21
Timothy J. Crowley
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLL TAXES
On August 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the Attor-
ney General of the United States to file suits in states that required the
payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting either in federal or state
elections.' The purpose of this litigation was to test the validity of a poll
tax as a voting requirement. President Johnson's action was hastened by a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on April 27, 1965,
in Harman v. Forssenius,2 which originated in the courts of Virginia.
This was the first time the Supreme Court had to construe the twenty-
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that
20 OKLA. STAT. tit. 84 § 213 (1961).
2 1 Oberlander v. Eddington, 391 P.2d 889 (Okla. 1964).
1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.2380 U.S. 528 (1965).
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the right of citizens to vote in federal elections ". . . shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax." More specifically, the Harman case dealt with
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute which required a voter in federal
elections either to pay a poll tax, or to file a witnessed or notarized certi-
ficate of residence.3 A federal district court in Virginia previously had
held this same statute is being violative of the seventeenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.4 The Supreme Court, in the Harman case,
affirmed the decision of the federal district court, and held the Virginia
statute repugnant to the twenty-fourth amendment of the federal consti-
tution.
The Court, in its opinion, made it clear that the twenty-fourth amend-
ment abolished the poll tax in any way, shape, or form, as it applied to
federal elections while pointing out that proposals to end poll taxes as
applied to both state and federal elections had been introduced in every
Congress since 1939.5 Substantial weight also was accorded findings of
congressional hearings, committee reports, and debates, which strongly
indicate a desire that poll taxes be eliminated for economic, social and
constitutional reasons. By delving into this type of information the pro-
priety and necessity of looking beyond strict case law in rendering deci-
sions of sociological and legal importance was demonstrated once again.
Virginia argued that the federal constitution vested the power to
create voter qualifications in federal elections with the states. While ad-
mitting that numerous decisions had so held,6 Chief Justice Warren went
one step further, in citing cases which pointed out that state qualifications
may not contravene a valid constitutional provision of the federal govern-
ment and that the right of citizens to participate in congressional elections
is a right derived from the United States Constitution, not from the
states.7 In Smith v. Allwright,8 it was said, "Constitutional rights would
be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied."9 The Justices
appeared to follow this reasoning in announcing that the twenty-fourth
amendment ". . .nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
."10 of impairing guaranteed rights of citizens.
Virginia's contention that the poll tax or its alternative enabled the
state to avoid the complicated task of annual registration was not accepted.
A previous decision which held that remote administrative benefits to a
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 24-17.2 (Supp. 1966).
4 Forssenius v. Harman, 235 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1964).
5f1. R. REP. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).6 Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,- 360 U.S. 45 (1959);
Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1903).
7 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
s321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9 Id. at 664.
10 Gomillion v. Lightfoor, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
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state would not justify depriving a citizen of his constitutional rights was
reaffirmed. 1 Stressing the fact that states which do not have a poll tax
have not been confronted with any great administrative problems in seeing
that only bona-fide citizens are allowed to vote, Chief Justice Warren ap-
peared to be hinting at the proposition that no matter how burdensome
state election procedure may be without the poll tax, this problem would
not be grounds for upholding the tax.
Leaving the administrative, judicial, and constitutional realms of rea-
soning, the Court turned to the premise that expansion of the right of
sufferage in this country should continue unmolested. Looking at past
legislative records of Virginia, it was concluded that the main objective
of the poll tax was a desire to prevent Negroes from voting. Apparently
influencing the Court on this matter was a speech, cited by Chief Justice
Warren, presented by Carter Glass at the 1902 Virginia Constitutional
Convention:
Discrimination! Why that is precisely what we propose; that,
exactly, is what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate
to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations
of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of
every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without
materially impairing the numerical strength of the white elec-
torate.
12
In defending the basic rights of sufferage of all citizens, black and white,
the Court referred to a 1964 case which said, The right to vote freely
for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.'
313
The twenty-fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
became effective on February 4, 1964.'4 Before that date, Virginia by
statute and by constitution had established fairly common requirements
for voting in state and federal elections. One of the requirements was to
pay state poll taxes of $1.50 annually to a state officer at least six months
before an election.15 The statute also provided for permanent registration.
Once registered, the electors could vote in future elections simply by pay-
ing the poll tax. Thus, there was a strict poll tax requirement placed upon
any voter in Virginia who wished to exercise his right to vote. Sensing the
ratification of the twenty-fourth amendment, the Governor of Virginia, in
1963, called a special session of the Virginia General Assembly. The pur-
pose of this session was to make provisions to allow persons to vote in
federal elections without the payment of a poll tax. The poll tax as an
11Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).12 Harman v. Forssenius, tupra note 2, at 543.
13 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
1425 Fed. Reg. 1716 (1964).
15 VA. CODE ANN. S5 24-17, 24-67 (1950); VA. CONsT. art. 2, S 18.
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absolute prerequisite to voting in federal elections was abolished. In its
place a provision was inserted requiring the voter to file a certificate of
residence in each election year, or, at his option, to pay the poll tax.' 6
In striking down the Virginia statute, the Court emphasized that the re-
quirement of either paying the tax or filing the residence certificate had
the effect of imposing a material requirement only upon those voters who
refused to surrender their constitutional right to vote without first paying
a poll tax. With this decision, it appears that it will be futile for the re-
maining poll tax states to attempt to change or modify their poll tax re-
quirement in order to avoid the sanctions of the twenty-fourth amend-
ment.
In analyzing the reasoning behind the decision in the Harman case,
it is extremely important to emphasize that the question was not whether
a state had the power to abolish completely the poll tax and require federal
voters to file the annual certificate of residence. Rather, the point was
whether Virginia could ". . . constitutionally confront the federal voter
with a requirement that he either pay the customary poll taxes as required
for state elections or file a certificate of residence."' 7 Thus, it appears
evident that it was predominately the either---or requirement of the Vir-
ginia statute which led the Court in holding the act unconstitutional to
state:
The requirement imposed upon those who reject the poll
tax method of qualifying would not be saved even if it could
be said that it is no more onerous or even somewhat less onerous
than the poll tax. For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished
absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or
milder substitute may be imposed.:'
Recent discussions of the poll tax center around its use as a voting
prerequisite in the Southern states. Since 1920, the poll tax has been
abolished by state action in North Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia,
South Carolina and Tennessee.' 9 Today only Mississippi requires the pay-
ment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting, and this applies to state
and local elections only. Many states, including Oklahoma,20 have provi-
sions for a poll tax which have either never been used or have been
repealed. The poll tax does not represent a great economic deprivation to
anyone, since it is generally only between one and two dollars per year.
Why then, in light of these facts, was the existing law changed with
reference to poll taxes? Evaluating the decision in the Harman case, it
seems that constitutional law is continuing the trend of insuring the in-
dividual that his basic rights are upheld. Previously, the power of a state
to impose a reasonable poll tax as a condition of voting in a federal elec-
16 VA. CODE ANN. S 24-17.2 (Supp. 1964).1 7 Harman v. Forssenius, supra note 2, at 538. (Emphasis by court.)
18 ld. at 542.
.
0 
ENCYCLOPEDI BRIrAqICA, vol. 18, 173, (1959).
20 OKLA. CONsT. art. 10, S 18.
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tion generally was upheld. 21 It should be noted, however, that cases hold-
ing a poll tax valid generally arose under the fourteenth or nineteenth
amendments which did not specifically ban such a tax, as does the twenty-
fourth amendment. Typical of these past decisions is Breedlove v.
Scuttles,2 2 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1937. The de-
fendant, a tax collector, refused to register Breedilove, who was qualified
to vote in all respects except that he had not paid the required poll tax.
Justice Butler, speaking for the majority, held that the privilege of voting
was derived from the states, and that to make a poll tax a "... prerequisite
of voting is not to deny any privelege or immunity protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
' 23
With the ratification of the twenty-fourth amendment, plus the deci-
sion in the Harman case, the poll tax as a requirement to vote in federal
elections has been eliminated. Thus, it seems clear that the law as it exists
today will not allow the poll tax or any type of substitute as a require-
ment for voting in a federal election. Since the twenty-fourth amendment
was silent as to the use of the tax in state and local elections, the question
naturally arose as to whether the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite
to voting in non-federal elections would be tolerated. Three recent deci-
sions have answered the question in the negative. On February 9, 1966,
a United States District Court in Texas held the Texas poll tax unconsti-
tutional under the fourteenth amendment insofar as it required the pay-
ment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in federal, state, and local
elections.24 Three weeks later, on March 3, 1966, the Alabama poll tax
was also invalidated by a federal court on the premise that the tax was an
attempt to subvert the fifteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.25 Finally, on March 24, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United
States struck down Virginia's poll tax requirement, holding that a state
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment when-
ever it requires the payment of such a tax as a condition to voting in state
or local elections. 26 This ruling presumably will make further action
against the Mississippi poll tax unnecessary since the Supreme Court has
made it obvious that the poll tax as a voting prerequisite has no place in
our society as it exists today.
William E. Douglass
2 1 Breedlove v. Scuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898).
22 Breedlove v. Scuttles, supra note 21.
23Id. at 283.24 United States v. Texas, 34 U.S.L.WEEK 2441 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1966).
25 United States v. Alabama, 34 U.S.LWBEK 2491 (U.S. March 15, 1966).2 0 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 86 S.Ct 1079 (1966).
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